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What is the role of Western funders in China? This seeminglystraightforward question has been difficult for many to answer.For many donors, one particularly thorny question has been
whether to channel funding and other forms of support of government and
academic partners, or whether grassroots civil society organisations, which
are often the key recipients of Western rule of law funding in other parts of
the world, should play a more active role.
Both approaches have their merits: given the state’s deep involvement in
virtually all aspects of Chinese life, meaningful change is often impossible
without the state’s active participation or, at the very least, tacit approval.
At the same time, civil society organisations, even in their current relatively
weak and underdeveloped state, can and do play a key role in focusing both
government and public attention on issues that need to be addressed, and
in proposing progressive solutions to those problems.
In this article, I argue that all Western entities working on rule of law in
China – including not just private foundations, but also US and European
government-affiliated donor organisations and international NGOs active
in China, among others – need to pay more attention to the development
of civil society organisations, in particular rights-based and advocacy-based
civil society organisations. I argue that support for such organisations can
be beneficial not only in terms of the growth and development of the civil
society sector, but also in terms of substantive progress on the rights-based
issues that these groups address. In some ways, as I will argue in more detail
below, rights-based civil society organisations may be more effective in their
pursuit of a progressive reform agenda than government-affiliated organi-
sations or university-based entities, both because they are able to initiate
grassroots-level momentum for change, and because they are able to have
an impact on the enforcement of China’s own laws, a key weakness that
has hindered progress on the development of the legal system as a whole.
I argue that a deeper focus on advocacy-based civil society is all the more
important in 2012, for the simple reason that the momentum for government-
led, top-down reforms seems to have slowed. In the absence of reformist mo-
mentum at the top – save, as I note below, on a few key issues such as open
government information and certain aspects of criminal justice reform – the
need for creative and innovative bottom-up approaches becomes all the more
crucial. I also offer a few suggestions from a practitioner’s perspective on strate-
gies for deeper engagement with grassroots NGOs in China.
Historical background: Changing China,
evolving funding strategies?
The preference for collaboration with government or academic partners
has deep roots. (1) The earliest Western donors funding civil society and rule
of law initiatives began working in China in the mid-1980s, just a few years
after the reform era began in 1978. At that time, there were virtually no
civil society organisations in China with which to work – academic and gov-
ernment partnerships were almost the only option.
Donor engagement intensified in the mid-1990s, when Western-funded
rule of law programming began to be seen as a more politically palatable
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1. In 2002, for example, a leading scholar of Chinese law pointed to the preference by foreign actors
for government-affiliated partners. According to Alford, “The vast bulk of (foreign assistance)…
has tended to flow through and be directed toward actors that are either a part of the state or
closely affiliated therewith.” William Alford, “The More Law, the More….?”, Hope et al. (eds.), How
Far Across the River: Chinese Policy Reform at the Millennium, Stanford (CA), Stanford University
Press, 2003, p. 138.
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alternative to more traditional forms of human rights advocacy. In 1994,
then-President Clinton famously “delinked” human rights concerns from the
annual renewal of China’s most favoured nation trading status. Casting
about for a substitute for the human rights-trade conditionality that he had
finally concluded was unworkable, President Clinton eventually embraced
a cooperative rule of law approach as the new centrepiece of his China rights
policy. (2) In 1997, the US and China formalised their agreement to cooperate
on initiatives to aid in the development of the rule of law in China. (3) Many
European countries followed suit around that time. (4) Within five years, the
US Congress had overcome its initial reluctance to engage, and began to
offer significant funds to American NGOs, universities, and law schools look-
ing to develop cooperative rule of law programs with Chinese actors. For
many, Chinese universities, think tanks, government-affiliated entities such
as the All-China Lawyers Association and the All-China Women’s Federation,
and government agencies were seen as the best possible partners for 
Western-funded legal reform programs.
International donor engagement in China grew at a rapid pace. (5) By the
early 2000s, the number of funders, both public and private, active in China
numbered in the hundreds. (6) According to one estimate, international donor
support for work in China surpassed $100 million in 2000. (7)
Today, close to 20 years after President Clinton’s shift, many of the rule
of law and civil society development programs that began in the mid-1990s
remain a key element of both American and European approaches to reform
in China. Yet, in the aftermath of the 2008 global economic crisis, which left
many Western countries slashing their foreign aid budgets, and with China
increasingly seen as economically strong enough to be a donor rather than
a recipient of aid, some donors are pulling out of China. (8) It may be the
case that this phase of more intensive engagement with China on legal re-
form is coming to an end.
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, partnering primarily with either gov-
ernment or university-based actors could be more easily justified: at that
time, there were few truly functional non-governmental organisations to
partner with. In addition, it was believed that university-based actors had
particularly good access to government decision-makers, thus giving them
the ability to have an almost unique form of influence over legislative draft-
ing and policymaking processes.
Much has changed in China since that time. First and foremost, China’s
civil society movement has expanded dramatically: the official tally puts
the total number of NGOs at roughly 450,000, and unofficial estimates
climb as high as 8 million. (9) The sophistication and political savvy of the
best of the best of Chinese grassroots organisations are truly impressive, al-
lowing at least some NGOs to achieve a level of impact that would have
been unthinkable five or ten years ago. For many Western organisations
working in China, this means more options in terms of potential partnerships
than in years past.
At the same time, the past several years have also seen a diminishing com-
mitment by the state to pursue wide-ranging legal reforms. As two Chinese
scholars put it in a recent article, “There is no convincing evidence that the
Party is now engaging in meaningful reforms, although in some areas pos-
itive improvements have been made.” (10) In particular, the state has been
unable or unwilling to address shortcomings in implementation and en-
forcement of laws; the development of stronger and more independent legal
institutions has also been an area in which progress has been frustratingly
slow. (11) The optimism that surrounded small but meaningful steps toward
reform in 2003-2004 has long since given way to deep-seated pessimism
in many circles, with many declaring the government-led reform process
dead in its tracks. (12) In February 2010, prominent law scholar Jiang Ping
told an elite legal academic audience, “Looking at China’s current situation,
I think we are in a period where the rule of law is in retreat. Or perhaps,
building the rule of law, judicial reform, and political reform are all moving
backwards.” (13) Many observers have concluded that the lack of momentum
on the government side means that initiatives for reform will come from
the grassroots rather than from inside the walls of Zhongnanhai. In other
words, perhaps somewhat surprisingly for an authoritarian state such as
China, change will more often be a bottom-up rather than a top-down
process.
In many ways, the party-state has been quite open about its movement
away from legal reforms in line with international standards related to the
rule of law, including independent legal institutions, an emphasis on proce-
dural justice, and fair and transparent adjudication. Senior Party officials
with responsibility for the legal system have repeatedly remarked on the
inappropriateness to the Chinese context of “Western” legal norms and in-
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nalistic history of the Clinton Administration’s approach to China, see James Mann, About Face,
New York, Vintage Books, 1998, pp. 292-314.
3. Paul Gewirtz, “The US-China Rule of Law Initiative,” William and Mary Bill of Rights Journal, vol. 11,
2003, p. 603.
4. Sophia Woodman, “Driving Without a Map: Implementing Legal Projects in China Aimed at Im-
proving Human Rights,” Bell and Coicaud, (eds.), Ethics in Action: The ethical challenges of inter-
national human rights non-governmental organizations, Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 132.
5. For a summary of international donor engagement on the rule of law and civil society develop-
ment in China, see Human Rights in China, “Funding the Rule of law and Civil Society,” HRIC Issues
Paper, China Rights Forum, no. 3, 2003.
6. Nancy Yuan, “To Serve the People: NGOs and the development of civil society in China,” testimony
to the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 24 March 2003.
7. Ibid.
8. The United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID), for example, ended its
decades-long bilateral aid program in China in 2011. “Charity Begins Abroad: Big developing coun-
tries are shaking up the world of aid,” The Economist, 13 August 2011. The Canadian International
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March 2014; see Canadian International Development Agency China Overview, www.acdi-
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stitutional arrangements, and have emphasised the key political role of the
courts in maintaining social stability. (14)
The Chinese government’s reduced interest in legal reform raises difficult
questions for international actors working in China. When new, seemingly
conservative policies begin to emerge, is it better for Western actors to de-
cline to participate in the implementation of a policy that, at least in some
ways, may represent a retreat from rule of law values? Or is it better to try
to have a positive – and perhaps in some small way, ameliorating – influence
over the introduction of a new policy that is already a fait accompli? As
Beijing made known its preference for mediation, for example, legal aca-
demics and others who advise the government on court reform were called
upon to provide intellectual guidance for the courts as they implemented
the new policy. Some of these legal academics turned to their Western part-
ners for information and advice on the use of mediation in Western legal
systems. (15) To be sure, mediation can be a valuable part of any dispute 
resolution system. But the political motivations behind its embrace in China
in recent years are such that the benefits of the new policy to legal devel-
opment and the rule of law are in doubt, making it more difficult for Western
rule of law advocates to justify engagement on this topic.
The conservative shift by Beijing on legal reform also has broader, more
holistic implications for Western rule of law initiatives. Direct engagement
with the Chinese government on legal reform has often been justified in
part by reference to the Chinese government’s own self-interest in legal re-
form. (16) And, one could argue, there have been moments when an identifi-
able reformist faction existed within the upper reaches of the party-state.
In the 1980s, for example, reform-minded officials worked quite closely with
liberal intellectuals, some of whom in turn worked with Western donors,
who supplied them with much-needed comparative rule of law models. (17)
As noted above, in the late 1990s and early 2000s, significant progress was
made on strengthening the court system; no doubt the introduction of com-
parative models was helpful to that process.
No such reformist faction can be identified in Chinese politics today, and
state policy has turned away from even the modest technocratic reform ap-
proach of ten to 15 years ago. To be sure, individual government officials may
well form common cause with civil society activists to push specific reforms.
But they do so against a backdrop of a much more conservative state policy
toward legal reform in general. This conservative shift by the party-state
should trigger a strategic re-think by those Western actors who have focused
their collaboration on government and government-affiliated entities.
And yet, despite this shift in the overall political environment, and despite
many troubling signals that the party-state has lost interest in progressive
legal reform, all too many Western actors working in China in 2012 are pur-
suing similar strategies and working with similar or even the same Chinese
partners that they were working with in 2002. A recent article analysing US
foundation funding in China noted that the lion’s share of US foundation
dollars goes not to grassroots NGOs, but rather to government bureaus and
government-affiliated entities, including academic institutions. (18) According
to this analysis, a small handful of government bureaus, government-affil-
iated think tanks, and university-based research centres accounted for a
very high percentage of the overall funding picture, suggesting that many
Western donors are concentrating their funding streams in a very small
number of Chinese institutional hands. (19)
In some ways, 2012 would be good time to take a fresh look at the forms
of engagement by Western actors on rule of law and civil society develop-
ment. Increased attention to rights-based civil society organisations is now
possible as a result of the emergence of a small but growing number of such
organisations over the past several years. While many of the best advocacy
organisations that have been created over the past few years have been en-
vironmental groups, groups focusing on other issues, including anti-discrim-
ination, women’s rights, disability rights, and the rights of persons with HIV,
have also emerged. What makes these groups different from the much larger
number of service-based entities that make up the vast majority of civil so-
ciety organisations in China is their willingness to experiment with advocacy
tools that are, as yet, not yet widely used in the Chinese context, including
media strategies, public mobilisation strategies, strategic litigation, research
and reporting, use of the reporting mechanisms of international treaty bod-
ies, public protest (which the groups themselves usually refer to as xingwei
yishu, or performance art), and, in some cases, direct advocacy with gov-
ernment officials. Their ability to deploy these tools, often in creative and
innovative ways, sometimes allows these groups to be more effective than
other potential partner organisations that don’t use these tools.
Perhaps even more than service-based NGOs, which themselves often
have difficulties with the government, advocacy-based NGOs have to be
experts in the art of risk management. They regularly have to make difficult
decisions on when to push the envelope and when to hold back. They also
have to be extremely flexible: often unable to register as civil society or-
ganisations, they more commonly register as companies or decline to reg-
ister at all. Only through regular engagement with the relevant authorities,
including not just health, environment, and civil affairs officials, but also
bank clerks, tax collectors, and even state security agents, are they able to
keep their doors open.
To be sure, in the conservative climate of China in recent years, not all of
these organisations have survived. In 2009, one of the most innovative or-
ganisations in China, the Beijing-based Gongmeng, or Open Constitution
Initiative, was forced to close its doors after one of its founders was tem-
porarily detained on tax charges that were widely seen as politically moti-
vated. (20) Although the pathbreaking HIV/AIDS group Aizhixing remains
open, its founder, Wan Yanhai, fled China in May 2010 after months of ha-
rassment by the authorities. (21)
And yet, despite the very real political difficulties they face, not only do
the vast majority of these groups continue to operate, but many of them
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have grown in size, sophistication, and impact, and new organisations have
been formed. (22) The emergence of these organisations – non-governmental,
grassroots, and focused on rights-based advocacy – has as yet received little
attention from scholars both inside and outside of China.
At the risk of stating the obvious, the situation in China in 2012 is com-
plex. Many different actors, both inside and outside of the state structure,
are pushing for progressive change. There is also a benefit to the pursuit of
contrasting, complementary strategies by different funders. It cannot be
said, and this article does not argue, that support for state-led reform proj-
ects does not make sense; nor do I argue that all civil society-based projects
are productive. Certain reforms in recent years – including important ad-
vances in open government information (23) and the recent reform of the
criminal law – were more state-led, often with the help of senior Chinese
and Western academic experts; to ignore these important reforms would
be to fail to understand the full picture of how progressive legal change
happens in China.
That said, many of the Chinese organisations that are engaged in innova-
tive and path-breaking advocacy work have yet to come onto the radar
screen of international organisations working in China. This needs to change.
A growing number of observers, both Chinese and Western, believe that
change in China is more likely to be bottom-up than top-down. If so, inter-
national support should increase for truly grassroots civil society organisa-
tions that work within the system for meaningful, if incremental, reform. (24)
Why rights-based advocacy?
In many other parts of the world in which Western donors are active, the
question may be self-evident: support for rights-based advocacy organisa-
tions is the preferred mode for donors looking to have an impact on human
rights and the rule of law. (25) For better or worse, grassroots organisations
in many countries working on a range of issues have chosen to articulate
their goals in the language of rights. These groups often work closely with
local and national governments to achieve legislative change, and they also
attempt to use litigation tools to achieve their goals. They maintain regular
contact with international human rights groups working on similar issues,
and often act in coordination with those groups to pursue advocacy oppor-
tunities within the UN human rights system, taking advantage of the various
country review mechanisms created by various international human rights
treaties.
While these approaches, and the formation and development of NGOs
that can pursue them, have been central to the strategies of both domestic
activists and international donors working in many different countries, China
has been a latecomer to many of these approaches, and some of these tools
remain of limited utility in the Chinese context.
Instead, international actors working in China have relied more heavily on
partnerships with official actors, including university-based research centres,
government-affiliated think tanks, and government bureaus such as the
Ministry of Health. Even with the emergence of new organisations that em-
brace a rights-based advocacy approach, many donors remain committed
to a more state-centric model. (26) The argument for doing so is not without
merit: the state remains omnipresent in China, and little meaningful change
can be achieved without the party-state’s consent. Working directly with
state actors, or with academics whose voices are influential inside the walls
of Zhongnanhai, may seem like the most direct path to reform.
And yet, there is reason to believe that this approach may be less effective
than it was in the past. The decision to work directly with state actors or
with academics on the creation of new laws and policies implies a view of
how and why legal change happens in China: the government, benefiting
from the technocratic expertise of Western advisors, drafts a law that solves
a legal problem, and then implements that law nationwide.
Yet it remains open to question whether this model accurately represents
how progressive legal reform happens in China. As noted above, the party-
state’s appetite for reform may now be at the lowest it has been in decades,
which means that projects seeking to work directly with the state to achieve
change may founder on the rocks of political inertia.
In a number of cases in recent years – including key advances in anti-dis-
crimination law, (27) reforms to China’s mental health system, (28) increased
emphasis on due process in the courts, (29) and the elimination of a particular
form of arbitrary detention known as Custody and Repatriation (shourong
qiansong), (30) to name but a few examples – legal change was triggered by
different combinations of social activism, non-governmental advocacy, pub-
lic interest litigation, media attention, and mobilisation of public opinion,
all of which put pressure on the state – or gave reformists within the state
structure the opportunity – to take action. Given this growing list of pro-
gressive reforms that have been pushed forward by bottom-up grassroots
activism, Western donors should consider whether they should place a
higher priority on getting resources to the NGOs, lawyers, and others who
have helped spark these bottom-up reform movements. At the very least,
for those who view collaboration with civil society as less impactful – and
therefore less desirable – than collaboration with the government, these
and other examples of meaningful bottom-up change should provide food
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for thought as to whether prior strategic decisions on how to make a dif-
ference in China remain as valid as they once were.
One particular area of interest for Western actors looking to have an im-
pact on civil society development in China has been the regulatory frame-
work governing NGOs. (31) Over the years, various international actors have
collaborated with Chinese governmental and academic partners, particularly
Chinese university-based NGO study centres, to produce various studies
that offer recommendations on how to reform Chinese NGO law. While the
regulatory framework for civil society organisations in China is important,
a decision to focus on the legal framework also may elide the fact that the
state views the legal framework for civil society as a mechanism for con-
trol. (32) It is certainly true that, in recent years, the party-state has been will-
ing to adopt more flexible approaches to oversight of the civil society sector,
but it is possible that this flexibility is not part of a paradigm shift by the
government, but rather part of a more sophisticated approach to social
management. (33)
An emphasis on NGO law also elides the fact that in China, legal change
often follows, rather than leads, changes to the situation on the ground.
Therefore direct support for civil society organisations, particularly new and
up-and-coming groups, may have a more significant – if admittedly more
indirect and difficult to quantify – impact on government policy and law
over the long term.
Even if legal reforms lead to a more liberal regulatory framework for civil
society organisations, those reforms will be subject to politics. As one
scholar has noted, “Although contemporary CCP policy may be much more
legalistic, implementation of these policies is still very political.” (34)
In other words, the success of any legal reforms that do emerge over the
coming years will depend in significant part on the ability and willingness
of civil society organisations to push the envelope and insist on recognition
for rights-based advocacy activities. If only service-based organisations can
register, then any changes to the legal framework governing NGO activity
must be judged a mixed success at best.
Western donors focused on the overall infrastructure of civil society in
China should also ask whether the infrastructure they are helping to create
is largely geared toward the creation and development of service-based
NGOs. To be sure, the growing number of service-based NGOs in China is
a positive development: many such organisations provide much-needed
services to the communities they work with, and their work may make
many local governments more comfortable with the general notion of civil
society. However, Western donors need to ask whether they are making the
assumption – explicit or implicit – that service organisations will eventually
evolve into rights-based advocacy organisations.
While this assumption seems, on its face, quite reasonable, there are also
good reasons to doubt it. Many service-provision organisations, if they are
successful at delivering services to marginalised communities, may – quite
reasonably – decide not to rock the boat and stick with service provision.
An excessive focus on service provision, however, presents both benefits
and potential costs for grassroots organisations. First, in some ways, service
provision may be bad for the long-term sustainability of some groups. If the
state decides that a certain service is no longer needed, or if it is willing to
provide that service on its own, then what role will service provision NGOs
have left to them? (35)
In many cases, there are also limits to what a service provision approach
can achieve. An excessive focus on services can inculcate a mentality that
marginalised groups should be dependent on government for the provision
of services, rather than mobilising to vindicate their own rights. Even more
importantly, a focus on service provision may put a number of key problems
almost entirely beyond reach.
In the area of disability, for example, there are many issues on which im-
provement is impossible without first changing government policy, as well
as deeply-entrenched state practice. Despite a formal legal prohibition on
discrimination against persons with disabilities, many disabled persons find
it difficult to access regular schools, and are either placed in special schools
or, all too often, left at home. While it is true that education is a “service,”
civil society organisations in China looking to have an impact on improved
access to education for disabled persons will inevitably have to confront
very severe shortcomings in government policy and practice. In order to do
so effectively, such organisations would have to formulate and implement
advocacy strategies that are geared toward changing current policies and
laws.
One of the key reasons that many civil society organisations choose to
stick with service provision is that they find it easier to raise funds to engage
in service provision, and much more difficult – if not impossible – to raise
funds to engage in advocacy. As in many countries, the Chinese government
is a key funder of civil society organisations, either on its own or often acting
in tandem with international donors. Yet these funds often come with
strings attached, including very clear limits on the nature and scope of the
work that the organisation should engage in. (36) A number of grassroots ac-
tivists, working in various subject areas, have told this author that state
funds are often reserved for organisations that don’t cause trouble.
In light of these very real restrictions, the need for Western donors to sup-
port organisations that are willing to experiment with advocacy-based ap-
proaches becomes all the more apparent. Those advocacy-based
organisations that have already emerged have begun to serve as informal
models for other organisations looking to both better understand what kinds
of NGO activity are possible in the Chinese context, and to expand their
own skill set.
At the very least, Western donors choosing to focus on the state infra-
structure for regulating civil society organisations should have an articulated
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strategy for how the evolution of that infrastructure, and of the service-
based groups being sheltered within it, will take place, and what specific
steps need to be taken to facilitate this evolution. In the absence of this
strategy, Western donors may end up contributing less to the development
of a more vibrant civil society in China and more to the creation of the kind
of well-managed, service-based social sector that many observers believe
is the Chinese government’s overall goal.
Benefits of advocacy-based approaches
There are many ancillary benefits to working with civil society organisa-
tions that have too often been overlooked: when Western actors collaborate
with non-governmental groups in China, they have the opportunity to en-
gage in extremely valuable forms of skills transfer, and to assist in the insti-
tutional development that is crucial to the overall development of civil
society in China. (37) Increasing collaboration by international actors with
Chinese civil society groups may also raise their stature in the eyes of the
government, which is still very wary of non-governmental groups, and often
sceptical of the notion that they should be consulted on key law and policy
issues.
Those ancillary benefits are important, but they are not as important as
the fact that, on a number of issues, civil society organisations are often
more impactful than governmental or academic actors. By virtue of their
willingness to make use of advocacy tools that state-affiliated actors are
less able or less willing to use, advocacy-based NGOs may be more effective
at pursuing change. In some cases, their work may serve as a useful com-
plement to the work of reformists working within the system itself.
In addition, grassroots organisations often possess a number of unique as-
sets that may make them more effective than government-affiliated organ-
isations. First and foremost among these would be a higher degree of
legitimacy, often by virtue of the fact that many organisations have been
created and run by members of the community they serve. Whether it be
in the area of HIV/AIDS, LGBT rights, women’s rights, migrants’ rights, or
other issues, drawing primarily or even exclusively from the community it-
self can be a key component of creating legitimacy for any organisation
and also of creating pathways for knowledge.
If grassroots organisations are well networked within the community, then
they may be able to effectively engage in social mobilisation strategies in
order to achieve their goals. Very much aware of the state’s obsession with
social stability, (38) civil society activists can use the mobilisation of con-
stituent communities to focus both public and governmental attention on a
particular issue, and to generate political will for reform. At the very least,
this kind of social mobilisation can increase the costs to the government of
inaction, changing the cost-benefit analysis that the state must engage in
when considering whether and how to respond to calls for change. Given the
lack of progress on establishing transparent and independent legal channels
for redress of grievances, (39) social mobilisation may be one of the most po-
tentially effective tools for change in China today.
Strategies for grassroots NGO grantmaking
Given the many differences between grassroots civil society organisations
and larger, more bureaucratically stable GONGOs, academic centres, and
think tanks, grantmaking to grassroots entities can be quite difficult, and
can require a somewhat different approach by Western donors. In particular,
grantmaking to grassroots civil society organisations requires a greater de-
gree of flexibility and a bit more patience on the part of the donor.
Perhaps the most important element of working with grassroots civil so-
ciety organisations is a willingness to give small grants. Some organisations
have expressed reservations about giving small grants, not least because
doing so often increases the bureaucratic burden on the donor, which in
most cases has to engage in the same amount of paperwork, and cover the
same transaction costs, for a $20,000 grant as it does for a $200,000
grant. (40) And yet, the vast majority of grassroots organisations can only
handle funding in small amounts, as they lack the capacity to make use of
larger grants. In other words, an ability to give small grants is a crucial com-
ponent of a civil society-based strategy.
Western funders also must put aside their own notions of what a grass-
roots NGO “looks like,” and be willing to embrace the various forms that
Chinese civil society organisations adopt, especially in the early years of
their existence. Many grassroots groups are unable to register for years after
they are first established, (41) while others choose to register as private com-
panies rather than as non-profit entities. A number of grassroots groups lack
many of the components that are considered crucial elements of an NGO
in the West, including independent boards, separate, dedicated finance and
administration staff, or even, in some cases, a fixed office. (42) While working
with less fully established organisations does present very real logistical dif-
ficulties for Western donors, it is nonetheless a key aspect of deeper en-
gagement with grassroots civil society in China.
It must be acknowledged that grassroots NGOs, often lacking in bureau-
cratic capacity, can be more difficult to work with than other, more estab-
lished entities. In order to work effectively with grassroots organisations,
donors must embrace that lack of capacity, and respond to it with a greater
degree of flexibility in terms of grant applications, reporting, and other
donor-imposed requirements.
Also important – as well as difficult and very labour-intensive for Western
grantmaking organisations – is a willingness to seek out and engage with
start-up organisations. At the risk of stating the obvious, the only way to
“grow” a field is to ensure that there are new entrants into it, particularly
in parts of China that up to this point have seen less civil society formation,
which includes almost anywhere outside of Guangdong, Yunnan, and Beijing.
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Special feature
In some cases, support for small projects by individual activists who may
then go on to form new organisations can be an effective tool for generating
new civil society activity.
There is another reason why support for start-ups is important. In some
key thematic areas of NGO work in China, a “usual suspects” problem has
emerged, in which a number of Western organisations, both donors and
those looking to implement projects, all approach the same two or three
civil society organisations working in that field. While it can be beneficial
for Chinese organisations to have contact with a number of different West-
ern partners, it is also important that Western actors coordinate among
themselves so as to avoid overloading any particular organisation, and to
ensure that resources are spread across a thematic sector rather than con-
centrated in the hands of a small number of civil society groups.
A willingness to support new and recently-formed organisations also re-
quires a certain degree of patience. In my experience, many start-up organ-
isations make mistakes in their first year or two, often learning and
improving through a process of trial and error. Perhaps surprisingly, one com-
mon mistake is for organisations to be over-ambitious in terms of what they
can accomplish, and to take on more work than they can handle, thus caus-
ing them to fall behind on their commitments to their initial slate of proj-
ects. If a start-up organisation fails to deliver on its initial set of
“deliverables,” donor organisations should work with the grassroots group
to improve its own strategic decision-making, rather than ending the fund-
ing relationship.
A decision to focus on civil society also requires a willingness to have one’s
thematic areas of focus determined at least in part by which areas are more
receptive to civil society engagement. Given the political sensitivity of issues
related to criminal justice reform, and the continued use, when needed, of
the criminal justice system as a tool for silencing political dissent, for ex-
ample, it seems unlikely at present that civil society organisations would
be able to meaningfully engage in criminal justice reform. Media reform,
and free expression more generally, would be another area in which civil
society engagement would seem almost impossible.
A small number of such issues aside, the areas in which Chinese advocacy
groups can and do have an impact are many and varied, including disability
rights, women’s rights, labour rights, and LGBT rights.
Some have argued for a greater focus on institutional reforms, suggesting
that improvements in China’s judiciary, for example, will have a cross-cut-
ting impact on the entire Chinese legal system.43 While opportunities to en-
gage with Chinese officials on wide-ranging structural reforms can indeed
be valuable, work with civil society organisations can also have a broader
institutional impact. Advocacy-based civil society organisations engage with
government agencies and legal institutions in a number of ways, whether
through policy advocacy with health officials, for example, or through public
interest litigation in China’s courts, or through working with National Peo-
ple’s Congress delegates to push specific legislative changes to better pro-
tect the rights of disadvantaged groups. Their repeated and sustained
engagement can have a positive impact on the professionalism, responsive-
ness, transparency, and level of knowledge of these bureaucratic actors, and
in and of itself represent a form of institutional reform work.
Finally, international donors have an additional tool at their disposal:
they can encourage the international NGOs and academic entities that
they work with to increase their partnerships with Chinese civil society
organisations. While some international organisations may be initially re-
luctant to embrace collaborative work with Chinese civil society groups,
especially if they have a limited track record of doing so in the past, many
groups that have expanded their work in this area have found it hugely
rewarding. For funders, nudging international grantees in this direction
will likely have a positive impact on the quality of project implementation
as a whole.
Conclusion
Working on legal reform in China is a challenging business, the rewards of
which are often evident only months or even years later. Only those with
an appropriately modest view of how outsiders can be helpful should take
part in what is, in the end, a domestic reform process in which Chinese cit-
izens and the Chinese state will engage in dialogue and debate over what
kind of legal system China should have. Working on legal reform in China is
also fantastically difficult – it can be incredibly daunting to decide what the
right strategies and who the “right” partners are. I myself have repeatedly
gone against all of the suggestions put forth in the above pages, sometimes
to good effect, other times less so.
In fact, in writing this article, I have feared that putting forward arguments
in favour of increased collaboration with advocacy-based civil society or-
ganisations would lead some readers to conclude that I believe collaboration
with grassroots civil society organisations, in China or even in more fully
open societies, is easy. It is not. Working with grassroots Chinese civil society
organisations presents a number of difficulties, many of which are virtually
absent when working with Chinese universities and government agencies.
Those difficulties, some of which were noted above, include a lack of bu-
reaucratic capacity; structural barriers to engagement with, for example, un-
registered groups or groups registered as for-profit companies; and state
repression against domestic activists who are perceived to have crossed the
line.
None of these difficulties should be taken lightly. Yet, if Western actors
can increase their outreach to nascent civil society groups, particularly those
engaged in policy advocacy, they may be able, over a five to ten-year period,
to significantly increase the number of domestic groups that are doing cre-
ative, innovative, and impactful rights-based advocacy work at the grass-
roots level. Given the crucial role that civil society groups have played in
legal development and reform in other parts of the world, it may be the
case that Western support for such groups may one day be seen as one of
the most meaningful aspects of Western engagement with legal reform in
China.
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